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Abstract
Using a sample of reverse leveraged buyout (‘reverse-LBO’) firms, I find that dis-
cretionary accruals quality (AQ), the quality of accruals that are subject to man-
agement discretion, significantly improves from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO.
Moreover, buyout houses’ board seats and the length of firms’ stay-in-private
periods are significant explanatory variables for the cross-sectional variation in
discretionary AQ for post-reverse-LBO firms. My findings suggest that the moni-
toring provided by private equity buyout houses improves discretionary AQ,
consistent with the view of Jensen (1989a,b) that LBOs are a solution to ineffi-
ciencies that arise from agency problems.
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1. Introduction
This article investigates the monitoring impact of buyout houses, the backers
of reverse leveraged buyout (‘reverse-LBO’) firms, on reverse-LBO firms’ discre-
tionary accruals quality (AQ). Specifically, I examine how discretionary AQ (as
measured by Francis et al., 2005) changes from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO.
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Theory suggests that monitoring by buyout houses mitigates agency problems,
thereby improving discretionary AQ subsequent to a reverse LBO. Using a
partly hand-collected data set of 351 reverse-LBO firms, I find strong evidence in
support of this hypothesis. Moreover, I find that the length of the stay-in-private
period and the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses significantly
explain the cross-sectional variation in reverse-LBO firms’ discretionary AQ.
Overall, the evidence supports the argument put forth by Jensen (1989a,b) that
‘active investors’ serve as effective monitors by curbing opportunistic managerial
behaviour, thereby enhancing shareholder value.
It is only recently that the accounting aspects of LBOs and reverse LBOs have
become the subject of academic investigation. An example of such studies is Katz
(2009) using a unique sample of private firms that later undertook initial public
offerings (‘IPOs’). He finds that IPO firms that were backed by buyout houses
engage in less upward earnings management and are more likely to recognize
losses in a timely fashion, both pre-IPO and post-IPO, than firms that are not
backed by buyout houses but that are instead majority-owned by management.
Katz (2009) concludes from his findings that the better earnings quality is
attributable to the tighter monitoring and reputation considerations of buyout
sponsors. In a related finance study, Cao and Lerner (2009) examine the 3- and
5-year stock performance of reverse LBOs and find that reverse LBOs
outperform other IPOs as well as the stock market as a whole.
My article extends this LBO and reverse LBO research and makes contribu-
tions along several dimensions. First, I relate the monitoring role of buyout
houses in reverse-LBO firms’ earnings quality to Jensen’s agency theory and its
associated ‘active investor’ argument. Although Jensen (1989a,b) first suggested
that LBOs were a solution to the inefficiencies arising from agency problems, the
studies of Katz (2009) and Cao and Lerner (2009) ignore the agency issues in the
LBO setting and focus primarily upon buyout houses’ reputational concerns
stemming from their being ‘repeated players’ in the market. Although these latter
concerns are undoubtedly important, they are fairly generic to most settings. A
distinguishing feature of LBO target firms, however, is that they are not chosen
randomly, but rather tend to be firms with severe agency problems and signifi-
cant locked values. My discretionary accruals study is sensitive to the agency
issues underlying LBOs and thereby unites the literature related to earnings qual-
ity, LBOs and agency theory.
My study makes a second contribution towards understanding determinants of
earnings quality in a particular LBO setting. Prior literature (Dechow et al.,
2009) documents six categories of determinants: (i) firm characteristics, (ii) finan-
cial reporting practices, (iii) governance and controls, (iv) auditors, (v) equity
market incentives and (vi) external factors. When it comes to specific research,
one has to consider the context of the study and correspondingly chooses which
determinants to be investigated. As LBO target firms tend to have severe agency
problems, it is natural to focus on governance and control variables in determin-
ing those firms’ earnings quality. The specific contribution of this article is to
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document that two factors, stay-in-private period length and the percentage of
board seats held by buyout houses, provide incremental power beyond the
traditional proxies for monitoring in explaining the cross-sectional variation in
discretionary AQ. This finding is particularly interesting, given that the buyout
houses have been criticized for ‘flipping’ their portfolio companies and making
quick profits.
My study also offers several refinements in empirical design relative to the prior
literature. First, in terms of measuring financial reporting quality, this article
focuses on discretionary AQ, as opposed to discretionary accruals and asymmet-
ric timeliness as in Katz (2009). In their extensive review of the earnings quality
literature, Dechow et al. (2009) argue (in their abstract) that ‘Over the years,
researchers have devised various measures of ‘‘earnings quality’’ to represent
decision usefulness in specific decision contexts. These measures, however, have
become proxies for ‘‘earnings quality’’ in a generic sense, absent a decision con-
text. The result is that some papers use a proxy for earnings quality that does not
match the hypothesized form of decision usefulness in their study’. I follow the
suggestion of Dechow et al. (2009) by adopting a proxy for earnings quality that
matches the decision context under study. Specifically, I choose discretionary AQ
because there is a documented cost of capital effect associated with this measure.
A second innovative design feature of this study is its strategic choice of time-
frame for LBO sample firms, leading to both a more constructively valid bench-
mark and the minimization of sample selection bias. In choosing the firms with
which he will benchmark his private equity (PE)-backed sample, for example,
Katz (2009) uses non-PE-backed companies. This approach could be problematic
as private equity firms do not choose their targets on a random basis. Rather,
PE-backed firms are typically fundamentally different from non-PE-backed firms
even before they were bought out. Hence, it is questionable whether it is appropri-
ate to use the non-PE-backed firms as benchmarks. Another drawback of Katz
(2009) is that to overcome the difficulty of data availability, he restricts his sample
to include only firms with pre-IPO public debt. This imposes bias and it is unclear
how this bias might affect the generalization of his results. My article adopts a dif-
ferent approach, where comparison is made between pre-LBO and post-reverse
LBO for a group of LBO target firms. Not only do I not need to use non-PE-
backed firms as benchmarks, which is questionable, but I also have data readily
available for my sample firms as the companies were public during both periods.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes LBO
and reverse LBO activities. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops hypoth-
eses. Section 4 presents data, while Section 5 describes testing methodologies and
reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. LBO and reverse LBO
Leveraged buyout partnerships consist of a General Partner (GP) and Limited
Partners (LP). The private equity firm (such as KKR and Blackstone) serves as
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GP. Institutional investors and wealthy individuals commit the bulk of the capital
and become LPs. Leveraged buyout houses often first identify targets, and then
buy out the firm or a division of the firm (i.e. a divestiture) using leverage. After
taking the firm private, the buyout houses often push for a reorganization to
potentially add value to the firm, and then cash out either partially or fully. One
major channel of exit is via an IPO. For firms that have previously been subject
to LBO, this is often referred to as a reverse LBO or LBO-backed IPO. Kaplan
(1991) reports that 45 per cent of a sample of large LBOs completed between
1979 and 1986 later returned to public ownership. My hand-collected data1 gives
me 1240 buyout-backed IPOs. Hence, we have at least 21.5 per cent of LBO
deals, which eventually took the reverse LBO exit channel.2 Intuitively, larger
deals are more likely to choose IPO rather than sale to a third party as the exit
form because of transaction cost and illiquidity argument. Plus, the public
market is preferred to a strategic buyer, ceteris paribus, because usually the seller
would get a higher multiple in the public equity market. To conclude, the reverse
LBO is a very important channel for the buyout house to exit and gain liquidity.
Moreover, one can infer the significance of buyout-backed IPOs by looking at
the share of reverse LBOs in the IPO market. Thomson Financial data shows
that buyout-backed IPOs represent 26 per cent of the total value of IPOs in 2005
and set a record in 2006, making up almost half of all IPO offerings in the US.
Leveraged buyout activities started gaining momentum in the late 1970s and
prospered in the late 1980s. They cooled down in 1990s as the stock market
flourished, and then made a very strong comeback in the first half of the 2000s.
At the time of writing this article, LBO activities have significantly diminished
because of the deterioration of the credit markets that are so vital to LBO activi-
ties. Table 1 reports LBO activities across the years before the current meltdown
of the credit markets.
Panel A replicates the Table 1 from Jensen (1989a) and clearly shows that
LBO activity was trivial before the early 1980s but quickly became a very signifi-
cant event in the second half of that decade. At its peak in 1988 and 1989, LBO
transactions accounted for almost a quarter of the whole US M & A market’s
deal value (as shown in Panel B of Table 1). Panel B uses a different source of
data to show LBO activities over a much longer period (1985–2005).3 As shown,
LBO activities steadily waned in the 1990s, reaching bottom in the late 1990s
when the stock market soared. This is not surprising because private equity is an
alternative investment to the stock market. When the bear market started in the
1 I defer the more detailed description to section 4.
2 Note that the SDC database contains a total 5794 LBO deals, which include the most
recent ones. As the majority of the most recent ones are still private, the 21.5 per cent esti-
mate is biased downward.
3 The data in Panel A and Panel B differ in magnitude for the years of 1985–1989 that are
covered by both datasets.
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Table 1
Leveraged buyout (LBO) activities across the years
Panel A: The rise of the LBO in 1980s
Year














1979 16 64.9 59 5.4 1.4
1980 13 106.0 47 34.5 3.0
1981 17 179.1 83 21.0 4.8
1982 31 112.2 115 40.7 8.2
1983 36 235.8 139 58.2 16.6
1984 57 473.6 122 104.0 39.7
1985 76 349.4 132 110.1 41.0
1986 76 303.3 144 180.7 49.0
1987 47 466.7 90 144.2 36.0
1988 125 487.7 89 181.3 77.0
Source: Table 1, in Jensen, 1989a
Panel B: The recent revivals of the LBO
Year





















1985 41 464.8 152 104.6 35.0 8.7 14.0
1986 43 1045.1 236 143.4 78.8 8.7 22.5
1987 32 1211.6 183 110.1 58.9 8.6 21.1
1988 75 594.9 202 141.6 73.2 10.1 22.7
1989 59 1348.7 219 102.9 102.1 7.8 23.6
1990 20 614.2 118 230.4 39.5 4.4 8.6
1991 8 54.3 126 98.7 12.9 4.9 4.8
1992 6 70.3 156 114.4 18.3 6.0 6.1
1993 8 137.0 126 148.0 19.7 4.1 5.1
1994 10 119.8 115 174.3 21.2 3.3 3.0
1995 10 103.8 123 119.0 15.7 2.8 1.8
1996 9 825.9 109 290.0 39.0 2.3 4.4
1997 7 405.2 92 151.7 16.8 1.5 1.2
1998 2 182.3 76 160.0 12.5 1.0 0.5
1999 21 275.4 89 283.3 31.0 1.9 2.7
2000 34 392.4 124 273.0 47.2 3.1 6.3
2001 23 153.3 92 171.4 19.3 2.4 2.3
2002 11 117.9 81 409.5 34.5 2.5 7.1
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early 2000s, we naturally see a very strong come-back in buyout activities. In the
first three quarters of 2005, LBOs account for 13.2 per cent of the value of the
whole US M & A market.
Jensen (1989b) views the emergence of LBOs as a solution to the inefficiency
arising from agency problems. He claims that the lack of effective monitoring of
corporate managers in public companies destroys value. Typical independent
directors who supposedly represent shareholders do a poor job in curbing man-
agements’ opportunistic and value-destroying behaviour, such as empire-building
in companies with abundant free cash flow. Leveraged buyout specialists come
into play as ‘active investor’ to remedy the problem of managerial value destruc-
tion. In contrast to the usual outside directors who have little or no equity inter-
est in the firm, buyout houses own an average of 60 per cent of the firm’s equity
and therefore they are highly motivated to take the monitoring job seriously.
Jensen (1989a,b) concludes that LBO activities enhance value.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1. Earnings quality
Starting from Lev (1989), the concept of earnings quality has become a topic
of enormous interest to academics. Lev (1989) first defines earnings quality as
decision usefulness in the context of equity valuation. Since then, the term of
earnings quality has been extended to other contexts as well.4 In their extensive
literature review related to earnings quality, Dechow et al. (2009) criticize that
many researchers view those various proxies for ‘earnings quality’ in a generic
sense and therefore often mistakenly use a proxy for earnings quality that does
not match the hypothesized form of decision usefulness in their studies. They
Table 1 (continued)
Year





















2003 26 214.9 75 467.2 40.6 2.5 7.5
2004 19 524.6 149 462.1 78.8 4.1 10.1
2005 13 1952.4 108 398.1 68.4 5.7 13.2
Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, 1985–1999 and SDC database; CPI from St. Louis Fed is used to
inflate nominal dollars. Using PPI gets similar qualitative results. Year 2005 only includes the first
three quarters.
4 For various definitions of earnings quality, see the review paper Dechow et al. (2009).
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argue convincingly that ‘earnings quality’ is meaningless unless its specific deci-
sion context is carefully discussed.
A very important dimension of earnings quality, which is most relevant in my
study, relates to the quality of accruals.5 Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter
‘DD’) measure AQ by mapping accruals into cash flows and suggest that a weak
mapping implies poor AQ. They derive an empirical measure of accrual quality
as the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on
past, present and future operating cash flows. Francis et al. (2005) use DD’s
model to investigate whether investors price AQ. They find that poorer AQ is
associated with larger costs of debt and equity. Francis et al. (2005) try to
explain this by arguing that AQ is a proxy for information risk, which is not
diversifiable, and hence AQ enters into pricing. Francis et al. (2005) also distin-
guish between innate AQ (i.e. that which is driven by economic fundamentals,
such as firm size, variability of operations, length of operating cycle and loss inci-
dence) and discretionary AQ (i.e. that which derives from managerial choice).
There also exists a large amount of literature related to the determinants of
earnings quality. Dechow et al. (2009) review about 350 published articles across
the top five accounting journals and summarize six categories of determinants:
(i) firm characteristics, (ii) financial reporting practices, (iii) governance and con-
trols, (iv) auditors, (v) equity market incentives and (vi) external factors. A simi-
lar implication applies to the determinants of earnings quality; one has to
consider context in deciding which factors are the relevant determinants of a par-
ticular ‘earnings quality’ proxy. For instance, Dechow et al. (2009) argue that
‘We are not aware of papers that specifically analyse the role of growth, as a
determinant of timely loss recognition. Researchers have, however, examined
growth as a determinant of the external indicators of quality. AAER firms have
high market to book ratios and high accruals during manipulation years’ (p. 82).
This indicates that, in explaining cross-sectional variation of a particular proxy
of earnings quality, researchers need to consider which of the above six catego-
ries of determinants are relevant. Out of the above six categories of determinants,
financial reporting practices turns out to be the weakest one as evidenced by the
very few articles in this category. Dechow et al. (2009) attribute this lack of evi-
dence to the endogeneity problem, which makes it very hard to establish any
causal link.
3.2. Agency theory and active investor literature
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs arise when there is a con-
flict of interest between principals and their agents. One notable agency problem
5 Detailed discussions on the other proxies can be found in Dechow et al. (2009), and
Dechow and Schrand (2004). Here, I focus on AQ, which is the most relevant in the
context of this paper.
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is the ‘empire building’ associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). Free cash
flow is defined as the excess cash flow available after the firm has financed all of
its positive net present value (‘NPV’) projects. A manager who maximizes share-
holder value should disgorge free cash flow to shareholders rather than keep
them in the firm and invest in value-destroying projects. However, because of
conflicts of interest, managers may be motivated to use the excess free cash flows
to build their own empires, meaning to grow the firm beyond the optimal size to
benefit themselves at shareholders’ expense. The private benefits that a manager
can extract from ‘empire building’ include at least the following: increased power
because of more resources under her control, better compensation associated
with bigger firm size, more perks and social fame. To mitigate this particular
agency problem, one solution is to use more debt financing (without retaining the
proceeds in the firm) so that managers commit their future free cash flows to the
payment of interest on debt (which is mandatory by the debt contracts), which
thereby reduces the amount of free cash flow available to managers. Jensen
(1986) further argues that this debt creation is an effective substitute for dividends
to address the ‘empire building’ problem. Hence, agency-cost-minimizing con-
tracts would imply that a firm with severe free cash flow problems tends to have
more debt and less equity in its capital structure (Smith and Watts, 1992).
The firms subject to free cash flow problems are most likely to be those mature
firms with stable cash flows and few growth opportunities. Jensen (1986) points
out that firms with such characteristics are desirable LBO targets. In the absence
of buyout activities, the agency costs of free cash flow tend to be high because of
the ‘empire building’ incentive of self-interested managers and lack of effective
monitoring from a typical corporate board. Most institutional investors are ‘pas-
sive’ in the sense that if they are not happy with management, there is little they
can do but to sell shares. Moreover, typical ‘independent’ board members do a
poor job of monitoring management because of their low equity holdings. The
absence of effective monitoring tends to result in large value losses such that
external ‘active investors’ seize the opportunity to control the company and
recapture the lost value.
Jensen (1989b) describes ‘active investors’ as follows: ‘By active investor I
don’t mean one who indulges in portfolio churning. I mean an investor who
actually monitors management, sits on boards, is sometimes involved in dismiss-
ing management, is often intimately involved in the strategic direction of the
company, and on occasion even manages. That description fits Carl Icahn, Irwin
Jacobs, and KKR’ (p. 36). Jensen (1989b) further argues that LBO houses typi-
cally own 60 per cent of their portfolio company’s equity and hence have strong
incentives to be a serious monitor. In addition, buyout houses typically give a
large equity stake to management after they take control of the company. Kap-
lan (1988) documented that the average chief executive officer (CEO) of a buyout
house portfolio company receives $64 per $1000 change in shareholder wealth as
opposed to a typical CEO of Forbes 1000 firms who only receives $3.5 per $1000
change in shareholder wealth. The incentives of LBO firm CEOs are therefore
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more in line with shareholders, and accordingly, they should be less inclined to
engage in extracting private benefits.
3.3. Major hypotheses
My first hypothesis links the two bodies of literature discussed previously in a
particular LBO and reverse-LBO setting and predicts that the part of earnings
quality determined by managerial discretion will improve from pre-LBO to post-
reverse LBO because of the effective monitoring role of ‘active investor’ buyout
houses. However, the term ‘earnings quality’ here is not a generic term but rather
refers only to discretionary AQ.
I concentrate on discretionary AQ rather than total AQ because a large com-
ponent of AQ is because of business fundamentals and hence, by definition, has
nothing to do with managerial discretion. Because the monitoring role of buyout
houses only has an effect on managerial discretion, discretionary AQ is the right
metric to test empirically. More importantly, a logical story exists to support the
hypothesis based upon this particular measure of earnings quality. There is no
similar line of reasoning to support other earnings quality metrics and hence I
refrain from claiming that all measures of earnings quality will improve from
pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO. This is consistent with the caution made in
Dechow et al. (2009) that researchers should be careful in linking the right proxy
for earnings quality to their specific context.
My argument goes as follows: Jensen (1989a) predicts that firms who become
the targets of LBO tend to have fewer growth opportunities and more severe free
cash flow problems. We may build on Jensen’s insight and conjecture that the
reverse LBO is indicative of a shift in the investment opportunity set towards
one with more growth options.6 We thus may predict a shift of financing policy
towards one with less debt and more equity (Smith and Watts, 1992). That is to
say, after the reverse LBO, both debt and equity financing are essential for
reverse-LBO firms.7 As a poorer AQ may lead to a higher cost of both equity
and debt (Francis et al., 2005)8 and it destroys shareholder value, buyout firms
6 During the stay-in-private period, LBO houses first unlock values, then often times push
a change to transform the company towards more growth opportunities. Jeff Immelt,
CEO of GE, states that ‘We don’t buy growth, we grow what we buy’, and this same phi-
losophy is especially true for buyout houses. Untabulated results for my sample firms
show that market-to-book equity (assets) goes from 2.599 (1.860) in the pre-LBO period
to 3.684 (2.402) in the post-reverse-LBO period, and the p-value of testing the null
hypothesis of no difference is 0.0058 (0.0538).
7 Debt financing by far dominates equity financing in importance prior to reverse LBO.
After the reverse LBO, there is a swap between equity and debt, meaning both play
important roles in corporate financing.
8 Francis et al. (2005) claim that firms with the best AQ enjoy a 126 basis point (bp) lower
cost of debt and 210 bp lower cost of equity relative to firms with the worst AQ.
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will be ‘active investors’ and may monitor managements’ behaviour to curb man-
agerial discretion over destroying discretionary AQ. Hence, we have:
H1: Discretionary AQ increases in the post-reverse-LBO period as a result of buyout
firms’ active investor role in monitoring managements’ opportunistic behaviour.
My second hypothesis aims at explaining the cross-sectional variation in earnings
quality (using discretionary AQ as a proxy) across post-reverse-LBO firms. This
relates to the extensive literature on the six determinants of earnings quality sum-
marized by Dechow et al. (2009). Of these six, effective monitoring (governance
and controls) is hypothesized to be the major deterrent of managers’ opportu-
nistic behaviour in financial reporting in our particular agency problem-centred
LBO setting, leading to the following hypothesis:
H2: Buyout houses’ monitoring effectiveness will incrementally explain the cross-
sectional variation in discretionary AQ among reverse-LBO firms, after controlling
for other relevant determinants of earnings quality.
4. Sample identification and data description
I start with the SDC database to look for reverse LBOs; however, the coverage
of this database is rather incomplete. For example, searching the SDC US New
Issues database returns only 279 IPOs that have gone through previous LBOs.
The new issues database seems to have lost track of LBO history after 1998. Out
of the 279 identified buyout-backed IPOs, only 166 have valid LBO effective
dates, which is essential for my analysis. Doing another query on SDC’s M & A
database returns 298 LBOs that later undertook IPOs. Out of the 298 reverse
LBOs identified by the SDC M & A database, only 228 have valid LBO effective
dates. Combining these two SDC data sources yields 371 unique reverse LBOs,
with 312 of these having valid LBO effective dates.
Given the incompleteness of the SDC database, I supplement this data with
hand collection of sample firms. First, I refer to Mergers and Acquisitions maga-
zine. For each year between 1987 and 1999, in its November–December issue,
the magazine prints a list of reverse-LBO firms that went public during the year.
Use of this source significantly expands my buyout-backed IPO sample, but with
two drawbacks: first, the journal stopped providing the information after 1999;
and second, the list does not have LBO effective dates.
I augment the SDC- and magazine-sourced lists by searching the media via
Factiva and by visiting buyout houses’ websites to complete the data as much as
possible. This process yields a total of 1240 buyout-backed IPOs, with 704 of
these having valid LBO effective dates. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution,
average IPO size and average number of days in the staying-in-private period of
these reverse LBOs across the years. It is evident that the average reverse-LBO
IPO size has increased in recent years and that, on average, LBO firms stay in pri-
vate about three and a half years before they return to the public equity market.
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For the 704 reverse-LBO firms for which I am able to identify LBO effective
dates, I use iperm to find their coverage in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged
industrial annual file. I include only those firms with at least seven yearly obser-
vations either before their LBO effective date or after their IPO date.9 This leaves
Table 2








1980 8 7.7 18.2
1981 7 11.9 25.4
1982 2 2.5 5.1
1983 38 23.8 47.0
1984 14 11.6 22.0
1985 34 27.8 51.0
1986 100 38.8 70.0 484
1987 82 35.8 61.9 683
1988 35 8.7 14.4 496
1989 30 39.3 62.5 926
1990 38 35.5 53.2 1007
1991 102 87.5 126.8 1174
1992 137 84.7 119.2 1307
1993 105 62.0 84.9 1325
1994 72 40.7 54.2 1561
1995 48 69.8 90.6 1755
1996 52 64.3 81.0 1707
1997 65 105.8 130.5 1803
1998 37 140.5 170.7 1022
1999 42 203.2 240.6 913
2000 22 220.8 252.7 989
2001 21 184.1 205.3 1019
2002 24 192.2 211.1 1231
2003 22 232.0 249.0 1140
2004 57 198.5 207.8 1248
2005 46 254.3 254.3 1113
Total 1240 89.1 113.0 1267
CPI from St. Louis Fed is used to inflate nominal dollars. Using PPI gets similar qualitative results.
The days of staying in private is calculated by the difference between IPO date and LBO effective
date. When the LBO effective date is only in months, I choose the date to be the 15th of the month,
less often do I get only the year of the LBO, in which case I choose 1st July as the LBO effective date.
The last column is calculated based on incomplete data; however, for each year after 1986 and
including 1986, I am able to get at least 50 per cent of the reverse-LBO cases involved in calculation,
with more recent years having more coverage. Years before 1985 are left blank because I cannot find
enough firms to make the average results meaningful. Year 2005 only includes the first three quarters.
IPO, initial public offering.
9 This data restriction is necessary because the calculation of the AQ measured defined
below requires a minimum of 7 years of data.
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351 unique firms for the final sample, with 131 coming from the pre-LBO period
and 278 from the post-IPO period. Fifty-eight firms are represented in both
periods.
5. Testing methodologies and major findings
5.1. Measuring discretionary AQ
5.1.1. Accruals quality
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a model of AQ by measuring the extent to
which current accruals map into operating cash flows in the current period, prior
period and future period. Non-current accruals are excluded because of the long
lags between non-current accruals and cash-flow realizations. The residuals from
regressing current accruals on cash flows from operations reflect the accruals that
are not explained by cash flows, and the variation of these residuals gives a firm-
level inverse measure of AQ, i.e. a higher standard deviation of residuals implies
poorer quality.
McNichols (2002) augments the DD model by introducing the fundamental
variables from the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991 and Dechow et al.,
1995). Building on this combined model, Francis et al. (2005) construct their
AQ metric by first running the following industry-year-specific cross-sectional
regression for each Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industries with at least 20
firms in year t.
TCAj;t ¼ b0; j þ b1; jCFOj;t#1 þ b2; jCFOj;t þ b3; jCFOj;tþ1
þ b4; jDRevj;t þ b5; jPPEj;t þ ej;t
ð1Þ
where TCAj,t = DCAj,t ) DCLj,t ) DCashj,t + DSTDEBTj,t = total current
accruals in year t, CFOj,t = NIBEj,t ) TAj,t = firm j’s cash flow from opera-
tions in year t, NIBEj,t = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items
(Compustat #18) in year t. TAj,t = (DCAj,t ) DCLj,t ) DCashj,t +
DSTDEBTj,t ) DEPNj,t) = firm j’s total accruals in year t, DCAj,t = firm j’s
change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t ) 1 and t, DCLj,t = firm
j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t ) 1 and t,
DCashj,t = firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t ) 1 and t,
DSTDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34)
between year t ) 1 and t, DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization
expense (Compustat #14) in year t, DRevj,t firm j’s change in revenues
(Compustat #12) between year t ) 1 and t, PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of PPE
(Compustat #7) in year t.
Estimation of equation (1) produces industry-year-specific coefficients that in
turn yield firm-year-specific residuals ej,t, AQj,t then is defined as the standard
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deviation of firm j’s residuals, r(ej)t, where r is calculated over years t ) 4
through t.10
5.1.2. Discretionary AQ
The essential role of accruals is to make adjustments to cash flows over
time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better measure firm perfor-
mance. Dechow (1994) documents that cash flows suffer from timing and
matching problems that reduce their ability to reflect firm performance.
Accruals mitigate those problems, especially in the shorter performance mea-
surement interval, for the firms with greater volatility in working capital
requirements and investment and financing activities and with longer operat-
ing cycles. However, this benefit comes with cost. As accruals require
assumptions and estimations, the estimation error is introduced, with bigger
error leading to poorer AQ.
There are two sources of estimation errors in accruals. Palepu et al. (2000)
consider estimation errors as a factor that reduces accounting quality and argues
that estimation precision depends on firm characteristics such as complexity of
transactions and predictability of the firm’s environment. In developing this intu-
ition into a practical measure of accrual and earnings quality, Dechow and
Dichev (2002) identify five innate factors as relevant to AQ: firm size, standard
deviation of cash flow from operations, standard deviation of sales, length of
operating cycle, and incidence of negative earnings realizations. They find that
smaller firms, firms with greater cash-flow volatility, longer operating cycles and
a greater incidence of losses have poorer AQ. In this article, I follow Francis
et al. (2005) and measure each of these summary indicators on a firm-specific
basis, using rolling 10-year windows (require at least five observations in each
window). The innate factors affect AQ in an important way because their impact
is likely to be systematic and recurring.
The second source of estimation error in accruals is intentional error (as
opposed to unintentional error caused by innate factors) because of manage-
ments’ opportunistic manipulation of accruals to serve their own interest. A
number of studies document various motives of earnings management.11 It is
worth noting that the determinants of managerial opportunism are often viewed
as sporadic as opposed to recurring innate factors.
Dechow and Dichev (2002) do not disentangle ‘intentional’ estimation errors
from unintentional errors in an empirical way. Francis et al. (2005) propose the
following approach to decompose AQ into AQ driven by economic fundamen-
tals (innate AQ) versus management choices (discretionary AQ). First, they run
annual regression of equation (2):
10 Therefore, this AQ metric requires seven yearly observations.
11 For various incentives of earnings management, see Dechow and Schrand (2004).
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AQj;t ¼ q0 þ q1SIZEj;t þ q2rðCFOÞj;t þ q3rðSalesÞj;t
þ q4OperCyclej;t þ q5NegEarnj;t þ lj;t
ð2Þ
where r(CFO)j,t is the standard deviation of firm j’s Cash Flow from Operations
(CFO), calculated over the past 10 years. r(Sales)j,t is the standard deviation of
firm j’s sales, calculated over the past 10 years. OperCyclej,t is the log of firm j’s
operating cycle, NegEarnj,t is the number of negative NIBE years out of the past
10 years.
The fitted values from equation (2) produces an estimate of innate AQ in
year t, i.e.
Innate AQj;t ¼ q^0 þ q^1SIZEj;t þ q^2rðCFOÞj;t þ q^3rðSalesÞj;t
þ q^4OperCyclej;t þ q^5NegEarnj;t
ð3Þ
Naturally, discretionary AQ equals the residual from equation (2), i.e.
Disc AQj:t ¼ l^j:t:
5.2. Hypotheses tests
I use all the firm-years in the Compustat database to estimate equation (1)
for each of Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry groups having at least 20
firms in year t. Industry-year-specific coefficients yield fitted values and residuals
for each firm-year associated with the 351 unique firms in the final sample. The
AQ measure, AQj = r(ej,t), is the standard deviation of firm j’s residuals calcu-
lated over all of the available years. For the 58 firms that are represented in
both the pre-LBO and post-reverse-LBO samples, I calculate their AQ measure
for each of two periods separately. Because of the preset data restriction of a
minimum of 7 years of data, the AQ measure is a standard deviation of at least
five residuals.
I first compare pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO AQ using a t-test for differences
in the means of two independent samples, where the null is no difference between
the means. Specifically, I exclude the 58 overlapping firms from the 278
post-reverse-LBO group, leaving 220 firms in the post-reverse-LBO group and
131 firms in the pre-LBO group. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean AQ
for the 131 pre-LBO firms is 0.0499, while the mean AQ for the 220 post-reverse-
LBO firms is 0.0660, with a difference of 0.0161 that is significantly different
from zero at 0.03 per cent level. Panel B of Table 3 uses a paired comparisons
test on the 58 overlapping firms to test the null hypothesis that the mean of the
paired difference is zero. As shown, the mean of AQ difference is 0.0223 for the
58 constant sample and is significantly different from zero at less than 0.0001
level. The results in Table 3 support the notion that total AQ deteriorates signifi-
cantly from pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO period.
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I next decompose total AQ into its two components, innate AQ and discre-
tionary AQ, and examine how the composition of total AQ changes from
pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO. Hypothesis one predicts that discretionary AQ
will improve. Given the previous finding that total AQ deteriorates, for H1 to
hold, innate AQmust not only deteriorate but the magnitude of this deterioration
must also be sufficient to dominate the improvement in discretionary accruals.
I follow Francis et al. (2005), using the entire CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged
annual industrial file to run annual cross-sectional regressions of equation (2) to
extract coefficient estimates. For purposes of these regressions, I measure
r(CFO) and r(Sales) on a firm-specific basis using 10-year rolling windows,
requiring at least five observations in each window. For each firm-year associ-
ated with the 351 final sample firms for which the data requirements have been
met, I calculate the fitted values and residuals from equation (2), with the fitted
values representing innate AQ and the residuals representing discretionary AQ.
This leaves me with 843 firm-years (73 firms) from the pre-LBO period and 700
firm-years (160 firms) from the post-reverse-LBO period, with 33 firms overlap-
ping the two periods.
Table 3
Accruals quality (AQ) change from pre-LBO to post-reverse LBO
Panel A: The comparison of AQ between pre-LBO and post-reverse LBO: independent sample
Group Number of firms Mean of AQ
p-value of testing the
null of no difference in mean
Pre-LBO 131 0.0499
Post-reverse LBO 220 0.0660 0.0003






p-value of testing the null of
zero mean of the difference
Pre-LBO 58
Post-reverse LBO 58 0.0223 <0.0001
The data source for Panel A and Panel B starts from the 351 reverse LBOs that have identifiable LBO
effective dates and initial public offering dates and at least seven yearly observations either before
LBO or after reverse LBO or both. I get 131 firms before LBO and 278 firms after reverse LBO. These
two samples have an overlapping 58 firms. Panel A uses independent sample and compares the mean
between 131 pre-LBO firms and 220 post-reverse-LBO firms (i.e. I exclude 58 overlapping samples
from post-reverse-LBO sample). Panel B uses constant sample (i.e. the 58 overlapping firms) and tests
whether the mean of the paired difference is zero. Firm-specific AQ is defined as the standard devia-
tion of the residuals from equation (1), and the coefficients of equation (1) come from the industry-
year-specific cross-sectional regression of equation (1) on the whole CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged
annual industry file. Cash flow from operations in equation (1) is derived by using indirect method.
As robustness check, I also only use post-1988 direct cash-flow data to check the results, which remain
intact. LBO, leveraged buyout.
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Table 4 shows the mean AQ, innate AQ and discretionary AQ across the pre-
LBO and post-reverse-LBO groups, respectively, and tests the null hypothesis of
no difference between each of the three means across the two groups. The results
demonstrate that average AQ deteriorates from 0.0292 in the pre-LBO period to
0.0577 in the post-reverse-LBO period, which is qualitatively consistent with the
results reported in Table 3. Moreover, the average innate AQ declines from
0.0268 in the pre-LBO period to 0.0562 in the post-reverse-LBO period, while
average discretionary AQ improves from 0.0012 in the pre-LBO period to 0.0006
in the post-reverse-LBO period. The difference is very significant (p-value
<0.0001) for AQ and innate AQ and less dramatic but reasonably statistically
significant (p-value = 0.032) for discretionary AQ.
Table 4 shows that the discretionary AQ increases and the innate AQ decreases
in the post-reverse-LBO period, all consistent with H1. The former result is con-
sistent with the notion that buyout houses act as ‘active investors’ to monitor
managements’ opportunistic behaviour in producing accounting numbers, while
the latter finding reflects the possible impact of the change in the investment
opportunity set on AQ. Tables 3 and 4 also confirm that the total AQ decreases
in the post-reverse-LBO period, suggesting that business fundamentals have the
first-order effect in determining AQ.
H2 extends H1 in the sense that it predicts that the degree of buyout houses’
monitoring effectiveness should explain cross-sectional variation in discretionary
AQ for post-reverse-LBO firms. To empirically test H2, it is necessary to identify
two key sets of variables: (i) proxies for buyout houses’ monitoring effectiveness;
Table 4





























Pre-LBO 843 0.0268 0.0012 0.0292
Post-reverse
LBO
700 0.0562 <0.0001 0.0006 0.0320 0.0577 <0.0001
I follow Francis et al. (2005) and first use the whole CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged annual industrial
file to run annual cross-sectional regression on equation (2) to get the coefficient estimates, where I
measure r(CFO) and r(Sales) on a firm-specific basis, using rolling 10-year windows and require at
least five observations in each window. Then, for each firm-year associated with the 351 final sample
firms, if possible, I calculate the fitted values and residuals from equation (2) and record the fitted
value as innate AQ and the residual as discretionary AQ. In the end, I have 843 firm-years represent-
ing 73 firms in pre-LBO period and 700 firm-years representing 160 firms in post-reverse-LBO per-
iod. And the two periods have an overlapping 33 firms. LBO, leveraged buyout.
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and (ii) appropriate control variables that are known to affect discretionary AQ,
particularly in an LBO setting.
From Jensen (1986, 1989a,b), we know that our sample firms tend to have the
most severe agency problems. Hence, out of the six categories of earnings quality
determinants, corporate governance and control variables, along with auditors,
are likely to be the right candidates for control variables. Moreover, as discussed
earlier, firm characteristics are part of innate AQ and therefore there is no need
to control for this in analysing discretionary AQ. Regarding the other determi-
nants, financial reporting practices are considered to be unimportant (Dechow
et al., 2009), and equity market incentives and external factors are not applicable
in our setting. Therefore, the research design involves regressing the level of dis-
cretionary AQ on proxies for buyout houses’ monitoring intensity while also
controlling for conventional proxies for general board and auditor monitoring
effectiveness.
In particular, I follow Dikolli et al. (2009) and use four variables to represent
general board monitoring intensity, including a dummy variable to specify
whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board; the percentage of indepen-
dent directors on the board; the size of the board of directors; and the percentage
of the firm’s shares owned by the board. I also include the G-index as an addi-
tional control variable to measure the quality of corporate governance as in
Gompers et al. (2003). Our major variables of interest are two proxies for buyout
houses’ monitoring effort: the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses;
and the length of the stay-in-private period of reverse-LBO firms. The percentage
of buyout houses’ board seats is a proxy for buyout houses’ equity holdings and
also directly represents the buyout houses’ voting power. Accordingly, it is a
direct measure of buyout houses’ monitoring effort. The rationale for using the
stay-in-private periods as another measure of monitoring effort is that longer
holding periods are indicative of more complicated situations in terms of the
buyout houses’ restructuring of the firms and their unlocking of values. In such
difficult situations, there is a greater need for continuing mentorship and moni-
toring from the buyout house in order for the firm to do well post-reverse LBO.
Hence, a longer stay-in-private period may justify the need for a stronger moni-
toring role on the part of the buyout house even after reverse LBO.
Starting with the 700 firm-years representing 160 unique firms from the post-
reverse-LBO period for which we have a discretionary AQ measure, I use ticker
symbols to match the observations into the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) director and governance database. The IRRC provides a source
of conventional proxies for general board monitoring intensity. As the IRRC
database only covers 8 years of data: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004
and 2006, we have a significant reduction in sample because of missing years and
missing values. After merging with IRRC, the sample size is sharply reduced to
85 firm-years representing 39 unique firms. For each of these 85 firm-years, I
hand collect the percentage of board seats held by buyout houses, by going to
each firm-year’s proxy statement.
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I regress discretionary AQ onto the two sets of proxies for monitoring inten-
sity, the conventional proxies as well as proxies to represent buyout houses’
monitoring effort. Table 5 reports these ordinary least squared (OLS) regression
results.12 Consistent with H2, the results show that more intensive monitoring by
buyout houses, measured either by a higher percentage of board seats or by
longer stay-in-private periods, is associated with better discretionary AQ for
reverse-LBO firms. The impact of buyout houses’ monitoring intensity on discre-
tionary AQ is both statistically and economically significant, even after control-
ling for conventional proxies for general board monitoring intensity. It is also
worth noting that out of the conventional monitoring intensity proxies, only
board size and the indicator for CEOs having a dual chairman role are signifi-
cant. The board size variable carries its expected positive (and significant) coeffi-
cient, suggesting that bigger boards have more severe ‘free-rider’ problems,
resulting in weaker overall monitoring. The negative coefficient on the
Table 5
OLS regression relating monitoring intensity to discretionary accruals quality (AQ)
Dependent variable = discretionary AQ
Disc AQ ¼ a0 þ a1 & per buyout boardþ a2 & years privateþ a3 & gindex











The regression is based on 85 firm-years representing 39 unique firms in post-reverse leveraged buyout
(LBO) period. per_buyout_board, the percentage of board seats held by buyout house; years_private,
the stay-in-private period length of reverse-LBO firm; gindex, IRRC corporate governance index;
board_size, the number of directors on the board; CEO_not_chairman, dummy that takes value of one
if CEO is not chairman, zero otherwise; board_holding, percentage of stock held by the board
directors, excluding CEO; per_indep, percentage of independent directors on the board.
12 Theoretically, auditor quality should be a control variable as well. Prior studies usually
use an indicator for Big5 auditors as proxy for auditor quality. However, because of the
fact that the vast majority of our reduced sample firms have Big5 auditors, this control
variable lacks cross-sectional variation and thus has no explanatory power in the regres-
sion. We, therefore, drop the variable from Table 5.
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CEO_not_chairman variable implies that the separation of the CEO and chair-
man’s position improves monitoring effectiveness and is associated with better
discretionary AQ. Consistent with the view of Jensen (1989a,b) that independent
board members may fail to fulfil their monitoring responsibilities because of triv-
ial levels of equity ownership, the percentage of independent directors variable is
insignificant. Both gindex, which is often considered to be a noisy measure, and
board_holding, which represents the equity percentage interest of non-CEO direc-
tors, are also insignificant.
6. Conclusions
I find that discretionary AQ (i.e. the part of AQ determined by management
discretion) significantly improves from pre-LBO to post-reverse-LBO. Moreover,
buyout houses’ board seats and the length of the stay-in-private period
significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in discretionary AQ for
post-reverse-LBO firms. My findings suggest that private equity buyout houses’
monitoring role improves financial reporting quality and enhances shareholder
value, consistent with Jensen’s (1989a,b) view that LBOs are a solution to the
inefficiencies arising from agency problems.
My study is subject to two limitations. First, the sample size (especially for
testing H2) is relatively small. Second, although I use state-of-the-art control
variables for corporate governance and monitoring effectiveness, these variables
carry noises and hence the results may be subject to a potential correlated omit-
ted variables concern.
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